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Welfare Reform 
and New York City’s 
Low-Income Population
I. Introduction
he goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects of welfare 
reform on the economic well-being of low-income 
families in New York City. To do so, it is important to examine 
changes in both the social safety net and the income and 
earnings of vulnerable households and families. For families 
with low earnings capacity, programs providing cash and/or 
in-kind assistance may be the source of all or most of the 
economic resources available, or they may provide vital 
supplements to earnings. To investigate the extent to which the 
safety net is still in place in New York City, we use the New York 
City sample of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to 
compare program receipt before and after the passage of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA). We use the income and earnings data 
from the CPS to compare economic status. 
Cities around the country have benefited from the strong 
economic growth in the 1990s. The most recent data show that 
for the nation as a whole, between 1998 and 1999, the number 
of central-city residents in poverty fell by 1.8 million and 
household income of central-city residents, although still 
substantially lower than in the rest of the country, grew faster 
than elsewhere (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Job growth has also 
been strong in New York City in this period, actually surpassing 
the national rate in the most recent years. From 1997 to 1999, 
New York City job growth exceeded 2 percent each year, 
outperforming any equal span of time during the past three 
decades. The expanding New York economy has increased 
demand and possibly wages for low-skilled workers. Increases 
in the earned income tax credit (EITC) and the minimum wage 
have also made work more attractive to low-skilled individuals 
in recent years, and New York State supplements the national 
EITC with its own refundable credit.1
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of welfare reform 
from the influence of these other factors on welfare receipt and 
incomes of the vulnerable groups in a single city. Moreover, 
without longitudinal data, it is not possible to trace the flows 
between work and benefits programs in detail. We can only 
observe net changes in program receipt, employment, and 
income. Our goal in this paper is therefore more modest: to 
compare public transfer program participation and economic 
status among New York City households before and after the 
1996 welfare reform. We also investigate the extent to which 
the economic good news has translated into higher earnings 
and household income for families with low levels of education 
or single mothers. For those in the groups that have lost 
public assistance, we ask to what extent earnings have 
replaced the lost income. Are such families doing better, or 
about the same? Are more families able to combine public 
benefits programs with earnings, and how much has their 
household income changed?2 
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Although our analysis compares outcomes before and after 
PRWORA, it should be made clear that because the formal 
state plan for welfare reform did not take effect until 1999, we 
are not really evaluating welfare reform in New York City. 
Instead, our results primarily reflect the net effect of changes in 
city administrative policies—characterized as push factors—
and the pull of economic growth on the receipt of public 
assistance. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses the 
changes in welfare law and administrative policy in New York 
and their potential effect on public assistance recipients. 
Section III describes the data source. Section IV addresses the 
issue of the packaging of programs and the extent to which the 
social safety net has been preserved. Section V considers 
differences among ethnic groups in changes in public 
assistance receipt. Section VI describes the changes in income 
and earnings among New Yorkers at risk of needing public 
assistance. The final section summarizes our findings and 
highlights the most striking results. 
II. Legal and Administrative 
Changes to Programs
The major cash programs in the social safety net are Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)—known in New York 
as Family Assistance—and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI). General Assistance, previously known as Home Relief 
and now called Safety Net Assistance, has also been very 
important, particularly in New York City. As we use the terms 
in this paper, “public assistance” or “welfare” includes both 
AFDC/TANF and Home Relief/Safety Net Assistance, but not 
SSI. In New York City, a nontrivial number of households get 
both public assistance and SSI. The major in-kind programs 
are food stamps and Medicaid. 
Since the public assistance rolls hit a peak in 1995, New York 
City has been engaged in a vigorous program to reduce the 
number of public assistance recipients. According to monthly 
caseload data from the New York City Human Resources 
Administration (HRA), the number of public assistance 
recipients—including both Family Assistance and Safety Net 
Assistance—dropped by 50 percent, from 1,160,593 in March 
1995 to 576,723 in May 2000. New York City has one of the 
largest mandatory workfare programs in the country, with 
32,771 cases engaged in the Work Experience Program (WEP) 
in June 2000.
PRWORA severed the automatic eligibility link between 
public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid. The entitlement 
to welfare under the TANF program was ended, with a lifetime 
limit of five years of welfare receipt, and states were given 
considerable discretion in designing programs that substituted 
work for cash assistance. In general, the intention of the law 
was not to reduce eligibility for, or participation in, food 
stamps and Medicaid. In fact, there has been a concerted effort 
to expand Medicaid participation. The exception to this 
statement is that the eligibility of immigrants (noncitizens) 
for the various programs was restricted. 
Immigration is very important in New York City, and our 
results may be driven by differences between citizens and 
noncitizens. Therefore, we briefly describe the changes in the 
law regarding immigrant eligibility for public benefits 
programs. Historically, naturalized citizens and refugees have 
been eligible for the same benefits as native-born citizens, but 
legal permanent residents have been subject to “deeming” and 
“public-charge” restrictions, and temporary and undocu-
mented immigrants have been ineligible for benefits. 
Under PRWORA, undocumented immigrants and those 
on temporary visas remain ineligible for benefits (other than 
Medicaid emergency services). Except for refugees and asylees, 
legal immigrants arriving after August 22, 1996, are barred 
from all federal means-tested benefits (other than Medicaid 
emergency services) for at least five years, and effectively until 
they naturalize. For legal immigrants who were in the United 
States before August 22, 1996, the sponsor-income deeming 
period was extended for up to ten years for most types of 
benefits. 
PRWORA also barred noncitizen immigrants who were in 
the United States before August 22, 1996, from food stamps 
unless they had worked in the United States for ten years. Some 
states, including New York, have at least partially replaced the 
federal food stamp program with their own food subsidy 
programs. However, state replacement in New York is limited 
to those under eighteen, over sixty-five, and/or disabled. 
Subsequently, the federal government restored eligibility for 
this same population.
Another federal law enacted in 1996, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, tightened the 
requirements for sponsors to support immigrants. It requires 
sponsors to sign a legally enforceable affidavit to support the 
immigrant, if necessary, and authorized government-funded 
agencies to sue for reimbursement of means-tested benefits. 
Given the changes in the law, and the increased adminis-
trative hurdles that the city has raised to getting public 
assistance, our expectation was that New York City would show 
a reduction in the number of families getting the full package 
of programs—public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid. 
Nationally, the intent of the law was to reduce the receipt of 
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perhaps an expansion in Medicaid coverage. However, food 
stamps might be expected to decline more in New York than 
nationally because many new immigrants arrived in New York 
after 1996 and most of them are ineligible for food stamps until 
they become citizens. 
The receipt of public assistance depends both on eligibility 
rules and on the way in which the intake process is 
administered. The city has tried to rename its welfare offices 
“job centers,” with a change in goals from determining 
eligibility in a relatively straightforward way to actively 
discouraging applicants by “diverting” them into employment. 
Advocates for the poor have argued that in fact the way 
diversion works is that applicants are frequently misinformed 
about their eligibility and are improperly sent away from the 
welfare office with only minimal help finding jobs (Sengupta 
2000). As evidence that diversion has been important, we note 
a sharp rise in the number of applicants who were rejected for 
public assistance, from 26 percent to 56 percent, and a 77 per-
cent increase between 1993 and 1998 in the number of fair-
hearing complaints by applicants who were denied access to 
public assistance (City of New York, various years). In the vast 
majority of these hearings, the city’s actions have been 
overturned and applicants have been declared eligible for 
public assistance.3
 In response to complaints by advocates, the City of 
New York has been investigated by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture for illegally denying potentially eligible persons the 
opportunity to apply for food stamps, and a federal judge has 
ordered the city government to cease the conversion of welfare 
offices into job centers (Welfare Law Center 2000). These 
administrative and legal developments suggest that the food 
stamp rolls might be dropping in tandem with (or at an even 
greater rate than) the public assistance rolls. By contrast, New 
York City has made active efforts to enroll eligible persons in 
Medicaid, particularly low-income women during pregnancy 
and when they enter the hospital to give birth.
III. Accuracy of the Current 
Population Survey
Our data source is the March Current Population Survey. To 
conform to most other studies, our unit of observation is the 
household. Because the questions about receipt of most 
program benefits are asked about the household rather than 
the person, a household is treated as participating in a 
particular program if anyone in the household receives benefits 
from that program. The New York City sample of the March 
CPS consists of 2,123 households in 1995, 1,579 in 1996, 1,586 
in 1998, and 1,568 in 1999. To increase our sample sizes before 
and after welfare reform, we pooled 1995 and 1996 (“before”) 
and 1998 and 1999 (“after”). This gives us 3,702 households in 
1995-96 and 3,154 households in 1998-99. Because the March 
CPS asks about income and program participation in the 
previous year, we refer to the “before” period as 1994-95 and 
the “after” period as 1997-98. Due to the sample rotation 
pattern in the CPS, there is approximately a 50 percent overlap 
in our sample for two adjacent years; consequently, the 
standard errors of our estimates are biased downward. Because 
we are dealing with the low-income population, we ignore the 
topcoding of income data in the CPS. We use the March CPS 
household weights throughout, with Passel’s corrected weights 
and race codes for 1995 (Passel 1996). 
It is well known that the CPS underreports welfare receipt 
compared with administrative records. Throughout the late 
1980s and early 1990s, estimates of AFDC receipt from the 
March supplement to the CPS were about four-fifths the 
number of AFDC cases found in program records nationwide 
(Bavier 2000). After 1994, CPS underreporting became more 
severe, so that by 1998 the CPS estimates were only about two-
thirds the actual number of AFDC/TANF cases. 
In New York City, the CPS indicates that in 1994-95, on 
average 325,863 households per year received public assistance 
in at least one month. By contrast, New York City’s welfare 
agency, the HRA, reports an average of 472,177 public 
assistance households for December 1994 and December 1995. 
The 1997-98 average for the CPS is 252,718. The HRA numbers 
for December 1997 and December 1998 average 314,946.4 The 
ratio of CPS households to administrative households goes 
from 69 percent in the earlier period to 80 percent in the later 
period. The HRA reports a 33.3 percent decline in the caseload 
between December 1994-95 and December 1997-98, while the 
CPS indicates a 22 percent decline in households getting public 
assistance. Thus, while underreporting of public assistance 
receipt in the CPS was somewhat greater in New York City than 
nationally before welfare reform, in the later period there was 
less underreporting in New York than nationally. 
We have no explanation for the decrease in underreporting 
in the CPS in the later period. If caseloads were declining more 
rapidly in the later period than in the earlier period, then one 
might expect that the end-of-year administrative measure 
would be smaller relative to the “ever-on” measure in the CPS. 
However, the rates of caseload decline were very similar 
between 1994 and 1995 (14.1 percent) and 1997 and 1998 
(15.2 percent). One possibility is that changes in the CPS 
sampling frame caused the changes. However, experts at the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics say that the changes in the CPS 86 Welfare Reform and New York City’s Low-Income Population
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Public Benefits Receipt in New York City
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sample in New York during the period were normal ones that 
were unlikely to cause a sharp change in reported rates of 
benefits receipt.5,6 
When we look at the number of persons living in 
households with at least one public assistance recipient, the 
CPS shows 1,105,000 in 1994-95 and 884,000 in 1997-98. These 
numbers are very close to the administrative counts of 
recipients, which were 1,115,000 in February 1994 and 792,000 
in February 1998.7 This close correspondence does not mean 
that the CPS correctly counts all those getting public assistance. 
Person-weighting counts every person in the household as 
getting public assistance. This leads to an overcount of the 
number of persons, since in some households not all members 
receive public assistance—for example, child-only cases or 
cases where the adult gets SSI. Nonetheless, we take it as 
reassuring that the CPS count of the total number of persons 
benefiting from public assistance is close to the total number of 
actual recipients in New York City. 
Because the program definition of a food stamp household 
is much closer to the census definition of a household than is 
the case for public assistance, we expected food stamp receipt 
by households to be reported more accurately than public 
assistance. The CPS reports between 76 and 80 percent of the 
number of food stamp households reported by the HRA. 
Hence, while there is less underreporting of food stamps than 
public assistance in the “before” period, the degree of 
underreporting is similar in the “after” period.8 
IV. Packaging of Programs
To examine multiple program receipt, we look at both the 
overall population and that part of the population at risk of 
receiving public assistance (AFDC/TANF or General 
Assistance). “At-risk” households are defined as those that, by 
virtue of education or family structure, are likely to have low 
earnings capacity. We include all households whose head is 
under age sixty-five and has less than a high-school education, 
plus all female-headed households with children under age 
eighteen.9
Chart 1 shows the rate of receipt among all households for 
each of the programs separately. Between 1994-95 and 1997-
98, there was a drop in public assistance receipt from 11.3 to 
8.4 percent of households. Food stamp receipt also went down, 
from 17 to 15 percent. Medicaid receipt remained constant at 
25.2 percent. By contrast, SSI receipt increased over the period, 
from 8.6 to 9.3 percent. Among the population at risk of 
needing public assistance, rates of program receipt are of 
course much higher (at least two times higher for public 
assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid). However, the pattern 
of changes in receipt across programs is very similar to that 
seen for the overall population.10
The “any benefits” bars in Chart 2 represent those 
households that participate in at least one of the four programs. 
They show that the proportions receiving some benefit stayed 
about the same over the period. Thus, even with the strong 
Percentage receiving benefits
Chart 2
Receipt of Public Benefits Packages
By New York City Households, 1994-95 and 1997-98
Note: PA = AFDC/TANF or Home Relief/Safety Net Assistance;
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least two of the other three programs: Medicaid, food stamps, 
and SSI. Among all households, the drop is from 10.4 to 
7.4 percent, while among households at risk the drop is from 
32.9 to 23.9 percent. This drop closely parallels the decline in 
public assistance discussed above. 
The second pair of bars shows that the proportion of those 
getting a package including Medicaid, but not public 
assistance, goes up by an approximately equal amount. On its 
face, this pattern would seem to suggest that most people losing 
public assistance retained their Medicaid benefits. 
People losing public assistance can either exit the welfare 
system entirely or retain other program benefits. Longitudinal 
data, which track people on public assistance after they leave 
the rolls, would be required for a precise determination of the 
proportions in each group. However, our cross-sectional data 
suggest that both patterns occurred. For those getting public 
assistance, the most common pattern is also to get food stamps 
and Medicaid. Of the 8.6 percentage point drop in the 
Table 1









All White and Asian
Non-Hispanic
Households
Percentage receiving 1994-95 1997-98 1994-95 1997-98 1994-95 1997-98 1994-95 1997-98 1994-95 1997-98
All four programs 1.5 1.0 4.0 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.2 0.7 0.5 0.2
PA+FS+MC 8.6 6.1 27.7 20.3 20.1 11.1 12.6 11.7 1.7 1.2
PA+MC+SSI 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.1
SSI+FS+MC 3.8 4.2 4.7 5.0 6.7 6.8 4.3 3.7 2.3 3.3
PA+FS 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.1
PA+MC 0.7 0.8 1.4 2.1 1.6 1.1 0.8 2.1 0.2 0.1
SSI+MC 2.9 3.8 3.1 4.8 5.1 6.5 2.9 4.1 2.0 2.5
FS+MC 2.0 2.5 3.0 5.4 3.4 4.1 3.4 4.5 0.8 0.9
PA only 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
FS only 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.7
MC only 5.4 6.5 7.1 10.4 6.0 10.5 7.4 8.6 4.2 3.8
None 73.6 73.6 46.2 45.8 51.9 54.6 64.2 62.1 87.6 87.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Three to four programs, 
   including PA 10.4 7.4 32.9 23.9 23.5 14.5 15.6 13.2 2.3 1.5
Medicaid without PA 14.2 17.0 17.9 25.6 21.2 27.9 18.0 20.8 9.3 10.4
Any program 26.4 26.4 53.8 54.2 48.1 45.4 35.8 37.9 12.4 12.7
Sample size 3,702 3,154 1,095 925 1,255 1,117 727 603 1,720 1,434
Note: PA = AFDC/TANF or Home Relief/Safety Net Assistance; FS = food stamps; MC = Medicaid; SSI = Supplemental Security Income.
aHead is a nonelderly high-school dropout or a female with children under eighteen.
economy and the administrative push to get people off public 
assistance, we do not find a large drop in the number of 
households receiving at least some benefit from the social safety 
net in the immediate aftermath of welfare reform. 
The fact that public assistance receipt declined by more than 
food stamp or Medicaid receipt, while the proportion 
participating in at least one program stayed the same, suggests 
that some of those who lost public assistance retained other 
program benefits. To examine this issue directly, we look next 
at changes in multiple program receipt and the degree of 
“packaging” of the various public assistance programs. 
Chart 2 shows multiple program receipt for all households 
and for those “at risk.” Table 1 shows benefits packaging in 
more detail and the benefit combinations received by different 
ethnic groups. Households are grouped according to whether 
they did or did not get public assistance. The first pair of bars 
in each half of Chart 2 shows a substantial drop in the 
proportion getting the full package of public assistance and at 88 Welfare Reform and New York City’s Low-Income Population
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proportion of at-risk households who were getting the full 
package of public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid (and 
maybe SSI as well), about a third (2.7 percentage points) lost 
only public assistance. Moreover, the proportion of Medicaid-
only households increases by 3.3 percentage points. If all of the 
increase in Medicaid-only receipt comes from households that 
have lost both public assistance and food stamps, then one 
could conclude that of those who have lost public assistance, 
about 70 percent [(2.7 + 3.3)/8.6] have retained their Medicaid 
coverage. This would imply that at least 30 percent of those 
who got the full package before welfare reform and then lost 
public assistance have exited the public welfare system entirely. 
If Medicaid-only was expanding for reasons other than a shift 
from a package of programs to just Medicaid, then the 
proportion exiting the system would be correspondingly larger. 
Finally, if exits from the public welfare system of this 
magnitude have occurred, why has the overall percentage of the 
population getting some benefit not gone down? The answer 
lies in the increase in SSI receipt. The proportion getting SSI 
without public assistance increased by 2 percentage points, and 
100 percent of SSI recipients also get Medicaid. In other work, 
we have found that this increase in SSI is due almost entirely to 
an increase in program receipt among elderly noncitizens. 
V. Ethnic Patterns of Decline 
in Public Assistance
Flows off of public assistance are influenced by economic 
conditions, the characteristics of individual households, and 
changes in administrative rules and procedures. For example, 
the growth in low-skill, low-wage jobs in the New York 
economy could reduce the probability of being on public 
assistance more for those with less education. More stringent 
administrative procedures could impose a higher hurdle for 
those who are not fluent in English. 
To investigate the question of which groups are more likely 
to have left public assistance, we first focus on ethnicity. We 
divide the population into three groups—black non-Hispanics, 
Hispanics, and all others (including non-Hispanic whites, 
Asians, and Native Americans)11—and look at changes in the 
rate of receipt of public assistance. Next, we subdivide the 
Hispanic population by citizenship status and Puerto Rican or 
other origin. We then present a multivariate analysis of changes 
in public assistance receipt, which allows us to control for a 
number of demographic characteristics.
Chart 3 shows the change in the proportion of households 
receiving public assistance (AFDC/TANF and Home Relief/
Safety Net Assistance) between 1994-95 and 1997-98. What 
stands out is the large drop in the rate of receipt among 
Hispanics (9.8 percentage points) compared with blacks (less 
than 1 percentage point). In 1994-95, the rate of public 
assistance receipt is 50 percent higher among Hispanic house-
holds than among blacks, yet just three years later the rates are 
the same. The difference between the rates of decline for 
Hispanics and blacks is easily significant at the 1 percent level. 
The percentage point decline among whites and Asians is 
also small. However, because the white and Asian population is 
large, the decline still represents a substantial number of 
persons. Since initial rates of receipt differ sharply among the 
three groups, in Chart 3 we also show the percentage drop in 
public assistance receipt. The rate of decline is 38 percent 
among Hispanics, 36 percent among non-Hispanic whites and 
Asians, but only 3 percent among blacks. 
We next ask whether the drop among Hispanics affects only 
certain groups of Hispanics, or is similar for all Hispanics. In 
Chart 4, we divide Hispanics into Puerto Ricans (whether born 
in the mainland United States or in Puerto Rico), other 
Hispanic citizens, and other Hispanic noncitizens. The chart 
shows that the decline is substantial among all groups of 
Hispanics, but the biggest drop (42 percent) occurs among 
Puerto Ricans.
What explains the relatively large drop in rates of public 
assistance receipt among Hispanics compared with blacks? The 
greater decline could result from greater improvement in labor 
market opportunities, or from changes in the characteristics of 
households that put them at lower risk of receiving welfare, 
such as a greater decline in the proportion of female-headed 
families. Faster decline could also be due to increased FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 89
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administrative barriers making it relatively more difficult for 
Hispanics to navigate the welfare bureaucracy. 
To determine whether the greater decline in receipt rates 
among Hispanics remains statistically significant when we 
control for other factors that affect the probability of welfare 
receipt, we estimate a set of linear probability models of public 
assistance receipt. These models include ethnicity and the 
change from 1994-95 to 1997-98 for each ethnic group, plus 
various combinations of demographic controls. In some 
models, the effect of the controls is allowed to vary over time. 
The demographic controls are dummy variables for female 
headship, presence of children under age eighteen, whether the 
household head is under age sixty-five, whether he or she lacks 
a high-school diploma, and whether he or she is a citizen.12 
The change from 1994-95 to 1997-98 for whites and Asians, 
and the changes for blacks and Hispanics relative to white 
and Asian non-Hispanics, are summarized in Table 2. The 
t-statistic offers a statistical test of whether the drop in receipt 
is significantly greater among blacks or Hispanics than these 
others.
Model 1 corresponds to the division of households into 
whites and Asians, blacks, and Hispanics (Chart 3). The results 
indicate that the greater decline in receipt among Hispanics 
remains statistically significant under all specifications. 
Without any controls, the decline is 8.8 percentage points 
greater for Hispanics than for whites and Asians (column 1). 
Including the full set of controls and allowing their effects to 
vary over time reduces this difference to 6.2 percentage points 
(column 9).  Allowing the effect of family structure to vary over 
time (columns 6, 8, and 9) has the greatest impact on the 
probability of welfare receipt, because female-headed house-
holds with children experienced an above-average decline in 
welfare receipt since 1995, and Hispanics are more likely than 
whites and Asians in New York City to be single mothers.
By contrast, the regression shows no significant change in 
the rate of welfare receipt among blacks.13 Among whites and 
Asians, the decline is at or close to statistical significance until 
the effect of age and education is allowed to vary over time. 
When simple controls for the household head’s age and 
education are included, the decline for whites and Asians 
becomes significant at the 5 percent level. However, when we 
allow the effect of age and education to vary over time, the 
change for whites and Asians is always insignificant. This last 
result indicates that the effect of the household head’s age and 
education on the change in the probability of household 
welfare receipt completely explains the change in the rate of 
receipt by whites and Asians. 
Model 2, like Chart 4, divides the Hispanic group into 
Puerto Ricans, other Hispanic citizens, and Hispanic 
noncitizens. As expected, the results for whites and Asians and 
blacks are unchanged from Model 1. However, among 
Hispanics, only Puerto Ricans continue to show significantly 
greater drops in rates of welfare receipt when we allow the effect 
of being a single mother to vary over time. The differential rate 
of decline for Puerto Ricans is reduced from 11.6 to 8.3 per-
centage points by the full set of controls in column 8. 
Among other Hispanics, the estimated declines are only 
about half as large as for Puerto Ricans, but the decline is 
measured more precisely for noncitizens than citizens. In fact, 
for Hispanic citizens, the decline between 1994-95 and 1997-98 
is not significantly greater than for whites and Asians. For 
noncitizen Hispanics, the decline is significantly greater at the 
6.5 percent level, even when we control for single motherhood, 
age, and education. However, when we control for the 
differential effect of single motherhood in the later year 
(columns 6 and 8 of Table 2), the decline for Hispanic 
noncitizens also becomes insignificant. This insignificance 
indicates that if a household is at risk of welfare receipt in 1997-
98 because it is headed by a female, then there is no additional 
likelihood that non-Puerto Rican Hispanics lost public 
assistance. Thus, once we introduce controls for the 
characteristics that put families at risk of receiving public 
assistance, the greater decline for Hispanics seems to have 
occurred mainly among Puerto Ricans.
Given the greater rate of decline in public assistance for 
Hispanics, it is also of interest to see whether the change in the 
packaging of benefits differs for this group. Chart 5 (Table 1) 
shows for Hispanics only the grouping of programs according 
to public assistance receipt, Medicaid receipt, and any benefit. 
The pattern is similar to that seen for all groups in Chart 2, 
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proportion with three or four benefits, including public 
assistance and food stamps, and a bigger increase in the 
proportion getting Medicaid, but no public assistance. The 
only substantive difference between Hispanics and the overall 
population is that there is a slight increase (2.7 percentage 
points) in the proportion of Hispanic households getting no 
benefits.
We were surprised by the fact that the CPS shows virtually 
no drop in the rate of public assistance receipt among blacks. 
Administrative records indicate a decline of 157,000 cases 
overall during the sample period, while the CPS shows a drop 
of 73,000 households of all ethnic groups. Because the black 
population of New York City increased slightly, the 
administrative records imply a decline in the rate of public 
assistance receipt among blacks. The question then becomes, 
why does this drop not show up in the CPS? Although it is 
possible that the patterns of underreporting of welfare receipt 
by different ethnic groups have changed since welfare reform, 
Table 2
Linear Probability Models of Public Assistance Receipt, by Ethnicity and Period Difference 
in Differences Relative to White and Asian Non-Hispanics, with Various Controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model 1 (all Hispanics)
 Change from 1994-95 to 1997-98
White and Asian non-Hispanics -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 0.015 -0.001 0.008 0.007
t-statistic 1.76 1.71 2.25 2.16 2.17 1.72 0.13 0.62 0.56
Change from 1994-95 to 1997-98, relative
  to white and Asian non-Hispanics
Black non-Hispanics 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.023 0.006 0.020 0.022
t-statistic 0.18 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.29 1.12 0.26 1.05 1.12
Hispanics -0.088 -0.084 -0.079 -0.076 -0.076 -0.065 -0.077 -0.061 -0.062
t-statistic 4.98 5.06 4.54 4.62 4.66 3.90 4.10 3.43 3.49
Model 2 (Hispanics by citizenship)
Change from 1994-95 to 1997-98
White and Asian non-Hispanics -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 — 0.014 -0.002 0.008 —
t-statistic 1.76 1.71 2.24 2.15 — 1.67 0.17 0.57 —
Change from 1994-95 to 1997-98, relative
  to white and Asian non-Hispanics
Black non-Hispanics 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 — 0.022 0.005 0.020 —
t-statistic 0.18 0.26 0.185 0.26 — 1.11 0.26 1.04 —
Puerto Ricans -0.116 -0.105 -0.104 -0.095 — -0.088 -0.103 -0.083 —
t-statistic 4.35 4.19 4.05 3.92 — 3.54 3.89 3.32 —
Other Hispanic citizens -0.040 -0.053 -0.037 -0.048 — -0.036 -0.036 -0.033 —
t-statistic 1.18 1.71 1.13 1.54 — 1.16 1.08 1.06 —
Hispanic noncitizens -0.060 -0.054 -0.055 -0.050 — -0.032 -0.053 -0.033 —
t-statistic 2.00 1.98 1.86 1.85 — 1.16 1.68 1.12 —
Controls
Female head, children under eighteen No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Dropout, nonelderly No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Noncitizen No No No No Yes No No No Yes
Interactions of controls and year No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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this seems unlikely. Further investigation of this puzzling result 
is clearly warranted. We are analyzing other data sets to see 
whether the same result is found.
VI. Income and Earnings 
of Low-Income New Yorkers
The previous section showed that many, but not all, of those 
who were on welfare apparently continue to participate in 
other benefits programs, particularly Medicaid. We also found 
a particularly sharp drop in public assistance among Hispanics. 
We now turn to the broader question of how New Yorkers 
with low household earnings capacity are faring after welfare 
reform. For households with low education levels or headed by 
a female, how has the mix of income sources shifted between 
public assistance and earnings, and how have the levels of 
income and earnings changed? Given the differential decline in 
public assistance for blacks, Hispanics, and whites, are the 
changes in household income different for these groups?
A second question focuses on public assistance recipients. 
An improving job climate in New York City, and increased 
sanctions for not working, might be expected to increase the 
proportion of public assistance recipients who are combining 
cash assistance and earnings. Are those who were still on public 
assistance in 1997-98 more likely to combine cash assistance 
and earnings than in 1994-95, and has total household income 
increased for this group?
We note at the outset that the March CPS asks whether 
anyone in a household got public assistance or earnings in any 
month during the previous year, but it does not tell us whether 
the two were received at the same time. Those reporting both 
public assistance and earnings may have received them at 
different times during the year.
Along with a number of other states, New York has raised 
the earnings disregard and lowered the benefit reduction rate 
for TANF recipients with earnings (New York State Office of 
Temporary and Disability Assistance 2000; Giannarelli and 
Wiseman 2000). Eventually, these changes should lead to an 
increase in the proportion of public assistance cases that also 
receive earnings. However, the changes in the disregard and the 
benefit reduction rate did not take effect until November 1999. 
Hence, they should have no impact on the changes in the 
likelihood of combining cash assistance and earnings between 
1994-95 and 1997-98. 
Chart 6 shows the mixing of income sources for at-risk 
households for blacks and Hispanics separately. Whites and 
others are excluded because the sample size is small and 
because the patterns are very close to those for Hispanics. 
Overall, the increase in the proportion of the at-risk population 
that gets both public assistance and earnings is small, going 
from 9 to 11.5 percent. As shown in the chart, there was a 
substantially bigger drop among Hispanics than blacks in the 
proportion getting only public assistance: 13 percentage points 
versus 8.1 percentage points. What stands out is the difference 
in where those leaving the “just public assistance” category go. 
Among blacks, almost all apparently wind up getting both 
public assistance and earnings. The increase in the percentage 
getting both public assistance and earnings is almost 90 percent 
Percentage receiving
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of the decrease in public assistance alone. By contrast, for 
Hispanics, the proportion getting income from both earnings 
and public assistance does not change, while the increase in the 
proportion with earnings-only is equal to 85 percent of the 
drop in those getting only public assistance. 
The above results show that in the first years after welfare 
reform, Hispanics were more likely than blacks to leave public 
assistance entirely, while blacks were more likely to combine 
public assistance and earnings. The differential pattern of shifts 
between Hispanics and blacks among public-assistance-only, 
earnings-only, and both suggests that for many Hispanics, 
earnings have increased enough to end eligibility for public 
assistance. However, for blacks, the earnings increase seems to 
have been more modest and therefore a higher proportion 
retain eligibility for public assistance.
Chart 6 shows that the proportion of the “at-risk” 
population getting both public assistance and earnings is 
unchanged for Hispanics, but increases substantially among 
blacks. Chart 7 would seem to contradict this story. It shows 
that among those getting public assistance, the proportion of 
recipients who also get earnings increased almost as much 
among Hispanics (12 percentage points) as among blacks 
(15.6 percentage points). The explanation for this apparent 
inconsistency is that among Hispanics, two things appear to 
have been going on at the same time. Of those getting only 
public assistance in the earlier period, a substantial number 
also got earnings in the second period. However, of those 
Hispanics getting both sources of income in the earlier period, 
many lost their public assistance benefits and wound up having 
only earnings. By contrast, among blacks, only the first 
“movement” occurred. Households moved from public-
assistance-only to public assistance and earnings, but very few 
households lost their public assistance benefits entirely. 
We would also like to know whether household income 
increased among those combining public assistance and 
earnings. As reported in our CPS samples, nominal household 
income actually went down for those combining public 
assistance and earnings (from $18,193 to $16,524). Unfor-
tunately, the sample size for this group is quite small (about 
100 households in each period), so our estimates are not 
very precise.
The small sample size makes it impossible to determine the 
reasons for the drop (or lack of increase) in household income 
among those combining public assistance income and 
earnings. One possibility stems from the fact that a household 
may have received income from both sources during a year, but 
not at the same time. Of those reporting both public assistance 
and earnings, some may have gotten public assistance toward 
the beginning of the year and earnings toward the end. Before 
welfare reform, the group leaving public assistance for work 
would  have consisted mainly of households “pulled” off 
welfare by attractive employment. After welfare reform, 
however, more families may have been “pushed” off welfare 
into low-wage jobs. On balance, this may have led to household 
income being lower than it was before reform for those 
receiving both public assistance and earnings in the same year. 
Lastly, we ask, how has economic well-being changed 
between 1995 and 1998 for New York City households with 
low earnings capacity? We examine changes in income and 
earnings both for those with positive earnings and for the entire 
at-risk group, again dividing the sample into Hispanics, blacks, 
and whites and Asians. The results are summarized in Charts 8 
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households with earnings and the average amount of earnings 
(in 1999 dollars) for those with some earnings. The proportion 
with earnings went up by 11 percentage points among 
Hispanics, as opposed to 4.9 percentage points among blacks. 
Among whites and Asians, there was no change. The increase in 
the proportion with earnings is statistically significant both 
among all “at-risk” households and among Hispanics, but 
insignificant among the other groups. 
The second half of Chart 8 shows the change in average 
household earnings for those with positive earnings. (All 
figures are adjusted to 1999 dollars, using the New York City 
values of the consumer price index.) Among blacks, average 
real annual earnings decreased by $3,277, while among 
Hispanics, average earnings went up by $2,171. Among whites, 
there was a decline of $1,268 (not shown). None of these 
changes is statistically significant, however. Although it is not 
statistically significant, the difference in the change between 
blacks and Hispanics is consistent with the greater decline in 
public assistance receipt among Hispanics than among blacks, 
as discussed above. 
The first half of Chart 9 shows earnings among all Hispanic 
and black households who are at risk of receiving public 
assistance. Average real earnings increased by $4,161 
(30 percent) for Hispanics, but fell by $798 for blacks. Only 
among Hispanics was the increase in earnings statistically 
significant. Among all households, the change in average real 
household earnings, although positive, was not significantly 
different from zero. Household income, shown in the second 
half of Chart 9, shows a pattern of change almost identical to 
household earnings, rising a statistically significant 22 percent 
among Hispanics and falling among blacks. 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
The 1996 welfare reform law marked a major change in 
national policy toward public assistance. Over the time period 
covered by our research, the City of New York has also been 
engaged in a vigorous effort to reduce the welfare rolls. To 
evaluate the initial effects of the new law and the change in city 
policies, we use the Current Population Survey to compare 
receipt of public benefits programs, income, and earnings 
among households with low earning capacity in New York City 
in 1994-95 and 1997-98. The CPS shows a 22 percent drop in 
the number of households getting public assistance. This 
estimate is well under the 33 percent decline in the caseload 
reported by the Human Resources Administration. However, 
food stamp and Medicaid receipt appears to be more accurately 
reported. The undercount suggests that some caution is 
warranted in interpreting our findings. 
Between 1994-95 and 1997-98, the CPS shows a drop in 
the proportion of New York City households getting public 
assistance, from 11.3 to 8.4 percent. Food stamp receipt went 
down by 2 percentage points, from 17 to 15 percent, while the 
rate of Medicaid receipt remained constant. The proportion 
getting at least one benefit (Medicaid, public assistance, SSI, or 
food stamps) stayed about the same over the period. Of those 
who had been getting public assistance, food stamps, and 
Medicaid and then lost their public assistance, we estimate that 
at least 30 percent have exited the public welfare system 
entirely. At most, 70 percent have retained some other program 
benefit. Surprisingly, the reduction in rates of public assistance 
receipt among blacks is negligible. The decline in public 
assistance receipt is significantly greater among Hispanic 
households than among other ethnic groups. When we divide 
the Hispanic population into various groups, the greatest rate 
of decline is among Puerto Ricans. When we control for other 
factors that might affect the rate of public assistance receipt, the 
significantly greater rate of decline holds up statistically only 
for Puerto Ricans. 
We also look at changes in income and earnings of public 
assistance recipients and households at risk of needing public 
assistance. Overall, we find only a small increase in the 
proportion of the at-risk population that is combining earned 
income and public assistance. However, among those who 
remained on the public assistance rolls in 1997-98, the increase 
was more substantial, with the proportion also receiving 
earnings going up from 27 to 43 percent. This increase 
probably results from both an economic pull—an improving 
job climate—and an administrative push—more emphasis on 
work requirements and greater sanctions for not working. 
Blacks were more likely than Hispanics to combine both 
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limited sample, we find no evidence of significantly increased 
income among those who did combine the two sources of 
income. 
The proportion of “at-risk” households with earnings rose 
from 62 to 69.2 percent, but went up more for Hispanics (by 
11 percentage points) than for blacks (4.9 percentage points). 
Among those with earnings, the average level of household 
earnings went down for blacks and up for Hispanics, but these 
conditional earnings changes are not significant for either 
group. Among the entire “at-risk” group, including those with 
zero earnings, there was a statistically significant increase in 
average real household earnings (30 percent) and income 
(22 percent) for Hispanics, but not for the other ethnic groups.
We conclude by highlighting what we consider to be the 
most striking results from this research. First, although there 
was a sharp drop in the rate of receipt of public assistance, the 
same proportion of the city’s households (26.4 percent) 
received at least some benefits under the social safety net in 
1997-98 as in 1994-95. This result reflects the strong fiscal 
incentives to maintain Medicaid enrollment and the increase in 
the number of SSI recipients. 
Second, despite the strong economy in New York, real 
earnings and income for at-risk households show no significant 
gain over the period studied. Almost 20 percent of those who 
relied on public assistance alone in 1994-95 had substituted 
earnings for public assistance by 1997-98. Another 10 percent 
combined earnings and public assistance. Nonetheless, for 
those with low education levels or headed by a single mother, 
total household earnings and income remained basically 
unchanged. The lack of an increase in earnings could result in 
part from the depressing effect on wages for low-skill jobs 
caused by the entry of many former welfare recipients into the 
labor market. It should be noted, however, that our measure of 
income does not take into account the earned income tax 
credit, which was increased substantially not only in 1993 but 
also in 1996. 
Differences between Hispanics and blacks may be 
characterized as “gap closing,” in that rates of receipt of public 
assistance and earnings levels of Hispanics converge on those 
of blacks. The next step in our research is to use the March 2000 
CPS to determine whether public assistance rates continue to 
decline more rapidly for Hispanics than for blacks, and 
earnings and income continue to increase more rapidly, or 
whether the rates have trended together as the economic 
expansion continues in New York City. Possible explanations 
for the observed gap closing involve data accuracy, language 
barriers, and economic factors.
First, there is a question of data accuracy. Although 
the decline in public assistance receipt among Hispanics 
is consistent with the overall caseload decline in the 
administrative data, the especially sharp decline among Puerto 
Ricans and the negligible change among blacks are surprising. 
We find this result for blacks hard to believe. More and better 
data are required to determine whether the rate of public 
assistance receipt actually did not drop among blacks, or 
whether our result reflects anomalies in the CPS data. 
The greater decline in rates of public assistance receipt 
among Hispanics between 1994-95 and 1997-98 would seem to 
be consistent with the hypothesis that language is an important 
barrier to understanding the new rules and policies 
implemented by New York City. However, this hypothesis is 
contradicted by the fact that the greatest drop in rate of receipt 
was among Puerto Ricans, who might be expected to face fewer 
language barriers than other Hispanics. 
An alternative explanation for the sharp decline among 
Puerto Ricans is that it reflects a complicated interaction 
between greater administrative barriers to receipt, differences 
in family structure and resources, and the “pull” effects of a 
stronger economy. Suppose that Puerto Ricans were more 
likely to cohabit, or live in extended families, and therefore 
were better able to draw on extended family economic 
resources than blacks. If those resources were increasing 
relatively rapidly because of the stronger economy, then the 
additional administrative hurdles, even if relatively uniform for 
all groups, could make Puerto Ricans more likely to leave the 
welfare rolls. 
On the earnings side, only Hispanics show consistent and 
statistically significant increases in employment, income, and 
earnings. Hispanics “at risk” for needing assistance started out 
the period with household earnings only 75 percent of the 
earnings of blacks. By 1997-98, their household earnings had 
risen to 105 percent of the earnings of blacks. Why did low-
skilled Hispanics do better in the labor market than other 
groups, particularly blacks? 
Kathryn Edin has suggested to us that one consequence of 
welfare reform may be a switch from informal to formal 
earnings, and greater reporting of those earnings on sample 
surveys such as the CPS. If Hispanics were more likely to rely 
on informal and unreported earnings than blacks, then the 
increase in earnings among Hispanics could represent a 
difference in reporting, rather than a real change in relative 
economic circumstances.
Another possibility is that the characteristics that help to 
determine income, such as education level, changed more for 
Hispanics than for blacks. Although the data do show an 
increase in education level among Hispanics, and a drop in 
rates of single motherhood relative to blacks, the differences are 
not great enough to explain the difference in outcomes. 
Moreover, the fact that our at-risk group is based on single 
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sharp increases in education or changes in headship would be 
selected out of the at-risk group. 
A third explanation for the increased employment of 
Hispanics is that the demand for Hispanics in the labor market 
has increased relative to blacks. This change could reflect 
employer discrimination, or the fact that the ability to speak 
Spanish is increasingly valued by employers in New York. 
Employer preferences for Hispanics over blacks have been 
reported in interview surveys conducted in a number of cities 
(Moss and Tilly 2000). The fact that both employment and 
earnings went up for Hispanics is consistent with both of 
these stories. 
Finally, the fact that Hispanics left the public assistance rolls 
at such high rates may have been related to their increase in 
earnings. Exit from public assistance reflects both push and 
pull factors. If the push factor of administrative hassling had a 
greater effect on Hispanics than on blacks, it may have forced 
Hispanics to increase their employment and earnings more 
than other groups. 
To conclude, it is axiomatic that researchers always call for 
more research. In this case, however, we feel particularly 
justified in doing so. In an era in which welfare policies are 
changing rapidly, patterns in receipt of public benefits, income, 
and earnings are highly important in understanding the well-
being of New York City’s low-income residents. There are 
some genuine puzzles presented by the data, and we hope that 
future research, by ourselves and others, will be able to explain 
the results more conclusively. Endnotes
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Tables containing the information presented in the charts are available 
from the authors.
1.  The New York State credit was expanded after 1997, so it now 
equals 22 percent of the federal EITC. 
2. For a national analysis along these lines, see Primus et al. (1999).
3. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 1997, the percentage of 
fair-hearing rulings in the client’s favor ranged from 85 percent to 
91 percent. In fiscal year 1998, the measure was changed, making it 
impossible to compare with the earlier period. The last statement is 
based on a communication with Glenn Pasanen, Associate Director of 
the City Project, on December 13, 2000. 
4. The HRA counts were prepared for us by the Office of Policy and 
Program Analysis of the Human Resources Administration.
5. Communication with Anne Polivka, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
November 19, 2000. 
6. One possible explanation for this increase in the reporting of public 
assistance receipt in the later Current Population Surveys was 
suggested to us by Kathryn Edin. Changes in the official names of 
many state welfare programs after PRWORA might be confusing to 
respondents, and could be expected to lower reporting rates for public 
assistance in the CPS. In the case of New York, the name change from 
AFDC and Home Relief to Family Assistance and Safety Net 
Assistance may have had the effect of increasing the reporting of these 
programs in the CPS because the names conform more closely to the 
wording of the census question on receipt of public assistance. 
7. The fact that the person count is much closer to the administrative 
count of persons receiving public assistance, while the CPS household 
count is between 69 and 80 percent of the number of cases, indicates 
that CPS households reporting welfare receipt typically are larger than 
caseload units. This reflects the frequency with which public assistance 
units live with other relatives.  The upward bias from counting persons 
in a household who are not part of the case unit offsets the 
underreporting bias.
8. A priori, we would expect the CPS to show a bias toward 
overreporting because the CPS measure is a measure of “ever 
received” the program during a year, while the administrative records 
are point-in-time measures.  Because of turnover, the former number 
is larger than the latter in welfare programs. 
9. A more targeted group at risk for AFDC/TANF would require both 
low education and female headship. It would include only female 
household heads with children whose mother lacks a high-school 
diploma. However, sample sizes are substantially reduced for this 
restricted group and are too small for fruitful analysis. Moreover, this 
would exclude the population at risk for General Assistance.
10. Tables containing the rates of receipt by at-risk households are 
available from the authors.
11. Throughout this paper, for the sake of brevity, we use “whites” 
to refer to non-Hispanic whites and “blacks” to refer to non-Hispanic 
blacks. The group “whites and Asians” also includes Pacific Islanders, 
American Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos. 














β11 (noncitizen*Yr9798) + error.  Model 2 breaks up each “Hispanic” 
term into three separate terms: Puerto Rican, other Hispanic citizen, 
and Hispanic noncitizen. The specifications in column 1 include only 
the terms identifying ethnicity. The specifications in columns 2-8 also 
include various subsets of the variables labeled “controls” in Table 2.
13. This result is obtained by adding !0.009 (row 1) and 0.004 (row 3), 
resulting in an insignificant !0.005.References
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